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One does not face too much trouble in defining quantum information as a field: It is the 
study of how quantum physics pertains to, and indeed transforms, issues of communi-
cation and computation. It came into its own in 1993, with the proposal of the “quan-
tum teleportation” protocol, though it had predecessors in the work of pioneers like John 
Archibald Wheeler and Alexander Holevo. The title of this compilation raises the ques-
tion “What is quantum information?” in a different sense, asking instead what kind of 
entity the basic subject of that field might be. Is “quantum information” a sort of fluid, a 
newer and more subtle phlogiston, in danger of flowing into a black hole like spoiled soup 
down the garbage disposal? Or, is it a more personal possession, tied to a specific agent the 
way that a Bayesian probability belongs to the individual gambler who asserts it? Many 
answers to this question have been declaimed, and the variations are hard enough to tally, 
let alone choose among. Like with so many debates in the region where quantum mechan-
ics shades into philosophy, this one exemplifies the old problem: You put two rabbis into 
a room, you get out three opinions. The essays in this volume stake out a variety of an-
swers, seldom if ever with enough force to compel assent, but often with sufficient clarity 
to confirm that the points being raised are indeed worth time, attention and professional 
respect.
I have more than one physicist friend whose response to the inquiry “What do you 
think about the philosophy of physics?” is, essentially, “I think it would be a good idea.” 
They do think that physics can now and then bear on Big Questions, and that the sort of 
work philosophers do should by rights inform how we physicists conduct ourselves. Philos-
ophy, they feel, should suggest new problems, reveal connections between problems already 
known, help us minimize confusion when we teach physics to the next generation—and yet 
the interesting conversations, on these fronts and more, seem to happen with frustrating 
rarity. (Part of the trouble may be that we tend to hear about philosophers the most when 
they have behaved badly.) And yet, sooner or later we need those conversations: “Shut up 
and calculate!” is not a stable position. Even the most ascetic claim—the assertion to shut 
up and calculate with one mathematical formalism rather than another—is in some way a 
claim about the character of the world. Perhaps bound up with historical happenstance and 
social convention, but a claim about Nature nonetheless: Were the world a different way, 
would we not, after we shut up, calculate in a different fashion?
A good example of cutting through the general confusion is the chapter by Adán Ca-
bello. His taxonomy of the “interpretations of quantum mechanics” could doubtless be re-
fined—for example, both “Copenhagen” and “Many Worlds” are more like genera than 
species—but it is already quite helpful in putting one’s finger on the main divisions of 
thought and temperament. Other selections in the book which particularly stood out for 
me include the following:
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The chapter by David Wallace is also commendable, attaining that pleasant level 
where, even when the reader disagrees with a remark, the system of thought from which 
that remark arises is transparent. Likewise, while the chapter by Sebastian Fortin and Ol-
impia Lombardi may be more closely wedded to Shannon’s original context for informa-
tion theory than most physicists care to be—I can easily see one grumbling, “We don’t call 
it telegram theory, for crying out loud”—it does a solid job pointing out places where we 
could stand to be less sloppy. For example, I do not think their critique of the “epistemic 
interpretation” of information theory would dissuade an epistemicist who has devoted sev-
eral sleepless nights to thinking that interpretation through (“Ah, what you call e, I call 
H(d/S), and it is the expected number of . . .”). However, the challenges they raise are the 
healthy sort, which at the very least ought to help put the important matters first when 
teaching information theory.
I was most disappointed with the chapter by Amit Hagar. His account of subjectivist, 
or personalist, interpretations of probability, such as that espoused by Bruno de Finetti, is 
seriously garbled. In turn, this confusion cascades into his discussion of Quantum Bayesian-
ism, the view that mathematical entities employed in quantum theory—particularly “quan-
tum states”—have the same status as Bayesian probabilities. I confess myself partial to this 
view, and in particular to what is perhaps the most radical form of it, the QBism advocated 
by Fuchs, Mermin and Schack; so, I felt rather let down to see it challenged in such a mud-
dled way. Hagar considers the statement “There is [a] 50% chance of rain in the DC area 
tomorrow.” He writes, “On the subjective account of probability, this statement can only 
mean that if one would have done a random sampling of the residents of the DC area, and 
asked them what is their belief about the weather tomorrow, around half of the subjects 
would answer they believed it would rain” (emphasis added). I do not know of any school 
of probability whose thought this describes accurately. The de Finettian account presumes 
only one necessary gambler: the agent who asserts the probability value in the first place. 
Following the tradition of information theory, let us call this agent Alice. When Alice 
states, “My probability for rain in the DC area tomorrow is 50%,” she is saying that she is 
willing to buy or to sell for fifty cents a lottery ticket worth one dollar should it rain in DC 
tomorrow. The formal rules of probability theory then follow from the normative require-
ment that Alice should not make a set of gambling commitments which open her up to a 
sure loss. In the jargon, one says that Alice should avoid the possibility of being “Dutch-
booked” (for details, see, e.g., Jeffrey’s textbook Subjective Probability: The real Thing). 
Nothing in this account insists that Alice take a poll of commuters grumpily waiting for 
the Metro!
This confusion over who possesses the probabilities in the de Finettian interpretation 
is compounded when Hagar turns to the “Wigner’s Friend” thought-experiment and at-
tempts to use it to expose an inconsistency in Quantum-Bayesian views. I do not think that 
Hagar’s discussion adds anything to the pages which QBists and proponents of similar in-
terpretations have already devoted to Wigner’s Friend. (For examples thereof, see respec-
tively Fuchs’ essay “Notwithstanding Bohr” and Brukner’s “On the quantum measurement 
problem.”)
An unfortunate omission is the lack of substantial discussion on the “epistriction” re- 
search program spearheaded by Spekkens. By devising theories that act as foils to quantum 
mechanics, resembling it in many qualitative and quantitative ways while admitting inter-
pretation in terms of local hidden variables, this work demonstrates that not all the peculi-
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arities of quantum theory are made equal. Some of its features, even celebrated ones like en-
tanglement, the no-cloning theorem and “teleportation,” are only weakly nonclassical—not 
nearly so enigmatic as they had first appeared. Wallace briefly mentions the original paper 
by Spekkens, but discusses neither the follow-ups nor the key idea of identifying which as-
pects of quantum theory cut to the essence of how it departs from classicality. (Since the 
“epistricted” theories are explicitly constructed to be examples of what Wallace terms “in-
ferential” theories, they are much more pertinent to his argument than their glancing men-
tion might suggest.) This work has tangible relevance to our understanding of what re-
sources a quantum computer requires in order to outperform its classical counterparts.
On the topic of computation, the talk of “quantum parallelism” by Federico Holik 
and Gustavo Martín Bosyk feels rather dated. The image of a quantum computer working 
by “trying all the solutions in parallel” is not a very good one, as work since the turn of the 
century has made increasingly clear. In fact, it obscures crucial points, particularly the fact 
that quantum computers offer greater advantages for some computational tasks than oth-
ers. (Steane’s “A quantum computer needs only one universe” is a fairly approachable essay 
on this topic.)
Overall, What Is Quantum Information? is a convenient reference point for discussions 
in that region where physics and philosophy intermingle. However, it should not be taken 
as the last word in any of those conversations. The philosophers may be more accustomed 
to this feeling of inconclusiveness than the physicists.
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